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Supply Management in Multiproduct Firms with
Fixed Proportions Technology
Onur Boyabatlı
Lee Kong Chian School of Business, Singapore Management University, Singapore 178899, oboyabatli@smu.edu.sg
This paper studies the supply management of a primary input, where this input gives rise to multiple productsin fixed proportions. My objective is twofold. First, I study fixed proportions technology under demand
uncertainty in comparison with the flexible and dedicated technologies. I show that fixed proportions technology
has a cost-pooling value over dedicated technology, which is larger than the capacity-pooling value of flexible
technology over dedicated technology. I identify the critical role that demand correlation plays with the fixed
proportions technology: in contrast to the capacity-pooling value, which decreases in demand correlation, the
cost-pooling value increases in demand correlation. Second, focusing on the fixed proportions technology, I
study supply management in the presence of contract and spot markets. I investigate how the optimal supply
management strategy should respond to changing market uncertainties, and the differences in this response
based on the contract type. I find that when the exercise price of the contract is high, a higher contract market
dependence is the best response to the increasing demand correlation or spot price variability. However, a lower
contract market dependence is the best response to the same when the exercise price is low. Managerially, these
results are important because they imply that the supply management strategy adopted as a response to a change
in the business environment should differ depending on the contract type. My results have implications about
the new product strategy and the procurement contract choice of the processors in the agricultural industries.
Keywords : contracting; risk management; multiproduct newsvendor; flexibility; spot market; agriculture;
coproduction
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1. Introduction
This paper develops a theoretical basis for under-
standing the trade-offs facing a processor in the sup-
ply management of a primary input, where this
input gives rise to multiple products in fixed pro-
portions. The problem considered here is relevant for
several agricultural industries. For example, in the
cocoa industry, cocoa beans are processed (by clean-
ing, roasting, and grinding) to produce cocoa liquor,
which is further processed (by pressing and milling)
to produce cocoa butter and cocoa powder. In the
sugar industry, sugarcane is processed (by grinding)
to produce sugarcane juice, which is then heated to
extract the white table sugar. The remaining crystal-
ized sugar particles are further processed to be sold
as animal feed. In the wheat industry, wheat seeds
are processed (by grounding and sieving) to produce
wheat bran and coarse powder flour, which is fur-
ther processed and sold as animal feed. In all of these
industries, a primary input is processed into multiple
products in fixed proportions.
In the operations management literature, as also
highlighted by Chen et al. (2013), multiproduct
firms with proportional production technology have
received very limited attention. Motivated by the
semiconductor industry, a stream of papers in this
literature studies coproduction systems, where mul-
tiple products are produced in a single run with
random yields. Because the focus is on yield uncer-
tainty, the majority of these papers assume determin-
istic demands. In practice, given the escalating lev-
els of uncertainty in the business environment today,
including in the agricultural industries, one of the
key determinants of supply management is demand
uncertainty. This stream of papers remains silent on
the impact of demand uncertainty. A vast amount
of papers in the operations management literature
study this impact in multiproduct firms with flexi-
ble production technology. These papers showcase the
flexible technology as a hedge against demand uncer-
tainty, and provide insights on how the profitabil-
ity and the supply management strategy is affected
by this uncertainty (Van Mieghem and Rudi 2002).
With the flexible technology, paralleling the fixed
proportions technology, a single input is capable of
producing multiple products; but unlike the fixed
proportions technology, each unit of input is used
only in one product. Therefore, it is an open ques-
tion whether the insights coming from the flexible
3013
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.5
7.1
14
] o
n 2
7 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5, 
at 
22
:12
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
 Published in Management Science
Boyabatlı: Supply Management in Multiproduct Firms with Fixed Proportions Technology
3014 Management Science 61(12), pp. 3013–3031, © 2015 INFORMS
technology analysis are applicable to the fixed pro-
portions technology.
The first objective of this paper is to answer this
question by studying the fixed proportions produc-
tion technology in comparison with the flexible pro-
duction technology. I analyze the impact of demand
uncertainty on the optimal supply management strat-
egy and the profitability with the fixed proportions
technology, and investigate whether there exist any
structural differences between the two technologies
based on this impact.
A common feature of the processors in agricultural
industries is that there are two markets of interest for
supply management: the contract market and the spot
market. Contract markets feature long-term arrange-
ments between the processor and its suppliers. These
contracts may take different forms in terms of pric-
ing and delivery requirement. The most common con-
tract form used in practice is the quantity flexibil-
ity contract (Kleindorfer and Wu 2003). A quantity
flexibility contract specifies the capacity reserved in
advance of the spot market. The actual delivery vol-
ume is decided within this reserved capacity on the
day. This contract form also encompasses the quantity
commitment contract where all the contracted vol-
ume is delivered. Spot markets are regional markets
primarily used as a topping up of the contracts on
the day. In agricultural industries, spot price shows
considerable variability (Meyer 2013) and constitutes
another source of uncertainty besides demand. There-
fore, it is important for the processors to understand
the impact of these uncertainties when choosing the
right supply management strategy. As highlighted in
Kleindorfer and Wu (2003), since the processors use
different contract types (such as quantity flexibility or
quantity commitment contracts), it is also important
to understand how this impact changes based on the
contract type.
The second objective of this paper is to develop this
knowledge base. In the operations management liter-
ature, a vast amount of papers study supply manage-
ment in the presence of contract and spot markets.
Barring Boyabatlı et al. (2011), there is no work in this
literature that focuses on the fixed proportions tech-
nology. Boyabatlı et al. (2011) study the optimal con-
tracting decision of a multiproduct firm that uses a
quantity commitment contract. I focus on a more gen-
eral contract form, quantity flexibility contract, and
investigate whether there exist any structural differ-
ences in the supply management strategy adopted as
a response to changing spot price and demand uncer-
tainties based on the contract type.
To analyze this problem, I propose a stylized model
in which I consider a firm (processor) that operates
under the fixed proportions technology. The firm pro-
cures a single input and produces and sells two out-
puts in fixed proportions of this input in a single
period so as to maximize its expected profit. The out-
put prices are fixed and the demands for the out-
puts are stochastic. The input can be sourced from
a spot market, and from a contract market using a
quantity flexibility contract, that is characterized by a
unit reservation price and a unit exercise price. The
firm chooses the contract volume under the spot price
and the demand uncertainties. After these uncertain-
ties are realized, the firm decides the exercise quan-
tity from the contract, and the quantity for the spot
market transactions (procurement and sales), which
collectively determine the processing volume, and in
turn, the production quantity of each output via the
fixed proportions of this processing volume.
My consideration of the product market charac-
teristics, i.e., the fixed product prices with uncertain
demand, is consistent with practice in several agri-
cultural markets (including cocoa, sugar, and wheat
markets), and is motivated by my conversations with
the procurement managers of a multinational con-
sumer goods company.1 This company procures a
wide range of products from processors to be used
as input for its food and beverage manufacturing
operations. For the majority of its agricultural input
(such as cocoa powder and cocoa butter) and chemi-
cal input originated from agricultural products (such
as sweetener, enzymes, preservatives), a fixed-price
contract with minimum and maximum delivery lim-
its is used. The contract price is fixed for two to three
months, which is consistent with the time frame con-
sidered in my single-period model.2 The actual pro-
curement volume is determined on the delivery date,
but the minimum and the maximum delivery limits
are specified when these contracts are signed. In sum-
mary, the upstream suppliers, i.e., the processors, face
stochastic demand for their final products with fixed
prices, consistent with my framework.
With this model, I first analyze the fixed pro-
portions production technology in comparison with
no-fixed proportions technology benchmarks. As
benchmark cases, I consider a firm that operates
under the flexible production technology, where a sin-
gle input is capable of producing two products, and
each unit of input yields an output only in one mar-
ket; and a firm that operates under the dedicated
production technology, where there are two inputs
that can each produce a single product. To generate
1 This company is one of the world’s largest consumer goods com-
pany in revenues, and its main products involve foods, beverages,
cleaning agents, and personal care products.
2 The fixed-price contract has several implementation advantages
for this company. On the upstream markets, it facilitates setting up
invoice systems with its suppliers. On the downstream markets,
it enables the company to keep a fixed market price for its own
products, as preferred by its customers.
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sharper managerial insights, I focus only on the con-
tract market for supply management. With the flex-
ible technology, as established in the extant litera-
ture, since the input can be allocated between the
two products in response to demand realizations,
there exists a capacity-pooling benefit over the dedi-
cated technology. With the fixed proportions technol-
ogy, since the input is used for both products at the
same time, there exists a cost-pooling benefit over the
dedicated technology. I show that the cost-pooling
benefit of the fixed proportions technology is larger
than the capacity-pooling benefit of the flexible tech-
nology. I identify the critical role that demand corre-
lation plays with the fixed proportions technology: in
contrast to the capacity-pooling value, which decreases
in demand correlation, the cost-pooling value increases
in demand correlation. A higher demand correlation
is beneficial with the fixed proportions technology
because it decreases the demand imbalance in the
product markets facilitating the effective usage of the
same input for both products. Whereas the optimal
contract volume always increases in demand correla-
tion with the fixed proportions technology, the oppo-
site holds true with the flexible technology when this
volume is smaller than the total expected demand.
These results have important implications for the
new product strategy of processors in the agricultural
industries. In particular, converting the biomass (the
organic residue from processing) into a by-product,
which benefits from cost pooling, is an alternative
strategy to creating a differentiated product by cus-
tomizing the input (through, e.g., different packaging
or flavoring), which benefits from capacity pooling.
My results underline the need for processors to take
a holistic view of their supply management, and to
manage it together with their new product strategy.
I next analyze the optimal supply management in
the presence of spot market, focusing on the fixed pro-
portions technology model. After the spot price and
the demand uncertainties are realized, the firm can
use the spot market to sell the contracted input or
to source additional input. These spot market options
are taken into account when the optimal contract vol-
ume is decided in the presence of uncertainties. I con-
duct sensitivity analysis to investigate how the opti-
mal contract volume should respond to a change in
demand correlation or spot price variability, and ana-
lyze whether there exist any structural differences in
this response based on the contract type. The inter-
play between the exercise price of the contract and
the impact of these uncertainty parameters provide
the following insights: When the exercise price of the
contract is high, a higher contract market dependence
is the best response to the increasing demand corre-
lation or spot price variability. However, a lower con-
tract market dependence is the best response to the
same when the exercise price is low. Managerially,
these results are important because they imply that
the optimal supply management strategy adopted as
a response to a change in the business environment
should differ depending on the contract type. Thus,
indiscriminately employing the same response with
different contracts, i.e., increasing or decreasing the
contract market dependence, can be a detrimental
strategy.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:
Section 2 surveys the related literature and discusses
the contribution of my work. Section 3 describes the
basic fixed proportions technology model. Section 4
derives the optimal strategy. Section 5 studies the
impact of demand correlation on the fixed propor-
tions technology in comparison with the flexible and
the dedicated technologies. Section 6 extends the fixed
proportions technology model to incorporate the spot
market, and analyzes the impact of spot price vari-
ability and demand correlation on the optimal sup-
ply management. Section 7 discusses the impact of
relaxing two of my assumptions. Section 8 concludes
with a discussion of main insights and future research
directions.
2. Literature Review
Two streams of literature are relevant to my study: the
first explores the supply management in multiproduct
firms and the second studies the supply management
in the presence of spot market. I now discuss my con-
tribution to each literature.
In the literature on supply management in multi-
product firms, fixed proportions production technology
has received very limited attention. Motivated by the
semiconductor industry, a few papers study copro-
duction systems, where multiple products are pro-
duced in a single run with random yields. I refer the
readers to Chen et al. (2013) for a review of the papers
in this stream. The standard coproduction problem
foresees different grades or quality levels of prod-
uct, where the demand for a lower-quality product
can be filled by converting a higher-quality prod-
uct. Because of these product substitution possibili-
ties, and the random yields (proportions) of the prod-
ucts, the supply management problem in a coproduc-
tion system is more complex than the one consid-
ered in my paper. Since the primary focus is on the
yield uncertainty, the majority of papers in this stream
assume deterministic demands to simplify the analy-
sis. Among the papers assuming stochastic demands,
Hsu and Bassok (1999), Rao et al. (2004), and Ng et al.
(2012) propose different heuristic solutions to the opti-
mal supply management in a price-taker newsven-
dor setting. Focusing on a price-setting newsvendor
problem with a utility-maximizing customer demand
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model, Tomlin and Wang (2008) solve for the optimal
production, pricing, and allocation decisions and ana-
lyze the value of different operational flexibilities. All
these papers remain silent on the impact of demand
correlation.
Another stream of papers in this literature investi-
gates the impact of demand correlation albeit focusing
on the flexible production technology. These papers
study the supply management of a primary input,
where the input may refer to inventory or capacity,
with the flexible production technology in compari-
son with the dedicated production technology (where
there are multiple inputs that can each produce a sin-
gle product) in a variety of settings. I refer the readers
to Boyabatlı et al. (2015) for a review of papers in this
stream.
I contribute to the literature on supply manage-
ment in multiproduct firms by (i) delineating the
impact of the fixed proportions technology on sup-
ply management by making a comparison with the
flexible and dedicated technologies, and (ii) studying
the impact of demand correlation with the fixed pro-
portions technology in comparison with the flexible
technology. I show that the impact of demand corre-
lation is fundamentally different for each technology.
For example, whereas the flexible technology benefits
from lower demand correlation, the fixed proportions
technology benefits from higher demand correlation.
In the literature on supply management in the presence
of spot market, the majority of papers focus on single-
product firms where the fixed proportions technol-
ogy is irrelevant. The papers in this stream provide
conditions under which contract market is used as a
part of the optimal supply management portfolio in
the presence of spot market. For example, Mendelson
and Tunca (2007) provide a rationale for the existence
of forward contracts, based on strategic spot trading.
Secomandi and Kekre (2014) demonstrate that for-
ward contracts are beneficial when transaction costs
of spot procurement are higher than that of contract
procurement. I refer the readers to Kleindorfer and
Wu (2003) for a review of the early literature and to
Kouvelis et al. (2013) for a review of the recent papers
in this area.
In this literature, only a few papers study multi-
product firms with the fixed proportions technology,
and barring Boyabatlı et al. (2011), there is no work
in this stream that studies contract and spot markets
for supply management. Focusing on a petroleum
refinery, Dong et al. (2014) analyze the optimal spot
procurement volume of two crude oils with different
quality levels that are processed into two products.
They study the value of two operational flexibilities,
range flexibility (the ability to process crude oil of
diverse quality), and conversion flexibility (the ability
to convert low-quality crude oil to high-quality crude
oil). Focusing on an oilseed pressing mill, Boyabatlı
et al. (2014) analyze the spot procurement volume
of an input (oilseed) that is processed into a main
product (crude vegetable oil) and a by-product (ani-
mal feed). They study the capacity investment deci-
sions of the mill, the pressing capacity for the input,
and the storage capacity for the main product. None
of these papers consider contract market or demand
uncertainty.
Boyabatlı et al. (2011) analyze the optimal supply
management decision of a meatpacker in the beef
industry, where the meatpacker processes fed-cattle
to produce a high-quality product (boxed beef) and
a low-quality product (ground beef) in fixed propor-
tions. The meatpacker’s supply management portfo-
lio consists of spot procurement and a quantity com-
mitment contract whose price is benchmarked on the
prevailing spot price. Paralleling the practice in the
beef industry, they assume a price-setting newsven-
dor model in each product market with downward
substitution possibility. They numerically show that
a lower contract volume is the best response to the
increasing spot price variability and demand cor-
relation. Motivated by other agricultural industries,
I assume a price-taker newsvendor model in the
absence of downward substitution. I focus on a more
general contract form, quantity flexibility contract,
which encompasses the quantity commitment con-
tract as a special case, and investigate whether there
exist any structural differences in the impact of uncer-
tainties based on the contract type. In particular, I
provide analytical conditions under which a lower
contract volume is the best response to the increas-
ing spot price variability and demand correlation, and
prove that the opposite result may hold based on the
contract parameters. I also delineate the impact of the
fixed proportions production technology by studying
this technology in comparison with the flexible and
the dedicated technologies.
In summary, although a vast amount of papers
study supply management in the presence of contract
and spot markets in a single-product setting, there is
no work (barring Boyabatlı et al. 2011) that studies
multiproduct firms with the fixed proportions tech-
nology. I contribute to this literature by (i) character-
izing the optimal supply management strategy with
the fixed proportions technology in a new model-
ing setting that is relevant for agricultural industries,
(ii) analyzing how this strategy should respond to
changing spot price variability or demand correlation,
and (iii) investigating whether there exist any struc-
tural differences in this response based on the contract
type.
The following mathematical representation is used
throughout the text: A realization of the random
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variable y˜ is denoted by y. Boldface letters repre-
sent column vectors of the required size, a prime
(′) denotes the transpose operator, Ɛ denotes the
expectation operator, Pr4 · 5 denotes probability, and
4x5+ = max4x105. The monotonic relations (increasing,
decreasing) are used in the weak sense unless other-
wise stated.
3. Model Description and
Assumptions
I consider a firm that produces and sells two prod-
ucts in a single selling season so as to maximize
its expected profit. The firm has fixed proportions
production technology, which I call proportional (P )
technology. With this technology, a single input is
capable of producing two products, and each unit
of processed input yields a1 and a2 units of prod-
ucts 1 and 2, respectively, where a1 + a2 ≤ 1. I model
the firm’s decisions as a two-stage problem: the firm
makes its procurement decision under demand uncer-
tainty (stage 1); and the firm makes its process-
ing decision after the resolution of this uncertainty
(stage 2).
For procurement, I assume that the firm uses a
quantity flexibility contract that is characterized by a
unit reservation price  > 0 and a unit exercise price
b ≥ 0. This contract encompasses the quantity commit-
ment contract where b = 0. The firm decides the input
volume to reserve QP by incurring the unit cost 
with respect to the demand uncertainty. After the res-
olution of this uncertainty, the firm decides the input
volume to be delivered within the reserved capacity,
i.e., the processing volume zP ≤QP , by incurring the
unit cost b. I assume that the firm incurs a unit pro-
cessing cost of > 0.
The firm faces a stochastic demand in each prod-
uct market, represented by D˜ ′ = 4D˜11 D˜25. After the
demands are realized, the processed input is con-
verted into the final product in market j by incurring
a unit production cost cj ≥ 0. The final product is sal-
vaged from a unit price sj ≥ 0 if there is no unsatis-
fied demand; otherwise, it is sold from a unit price
pj ≥ max4sj1 cj5. Since one unit of the processed input
yields aj units of product j , the firm faces a demand
Dj/aj for the processed input with a unit sales rev-
enue aj4pj − cj5 and a unit salvage revenue aj4sj − cj5+.
I assume that 4D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follows a bivariate dis-
tribution with mean 41125, and covariance matrix
è, where èjj = 2j for j = 112 and è12 = 12 and
 denotes the correlation coefficient. For comparative
statics analysis, I assume 4D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 to follow a
bivariate normal distribution.
4. The Optimal Solution for the
Proportional Technology
In this section, I describe the optimal solution for the
firm’s procurement and processing decisions. I solve
the firm’s problem using backward induction start-
ing from stage 2. All the proofs are relegated to the
appendix.
In stage 1, the firm reserved QP units of input.
In stage 2, the firm observes the demand realiza-
tions 4D11D25, and, constrained by QP , decides the
processing volume zP to maximize the profit. Let
çP 4zP 5 denote the profit for a given zP , and P denote
the optimal profit, i.e., P = max0≤zP≤QP çP 4zP 5. The
stage 2 objective function is given by
çP 4zP 5
0= −4b+5zP +
2∑
j=1
[
aj4pj − cj5min
(
zP 1
Dj
aj
)
+ aj4sj − cj5+
(
zP − Dj
aj
)+]
0
The first term is the sum of the exercise price and
the processing cost, and the second term denotes the
total revenues from the product markets. A pro-
cessed input generates revenue in each market, where
the firm has a sales revenue if there is unsatisfied
demand, and a salvage revenue otherwise.
The stage 2 objective function çP 4zP 5 is piecewise
linear and concave in zP . Therefore, the optimal solu-
tion occurs at the breakpoints 801D1/a11D2/a21QP 9.
The optimal processing volume zP ∗ is determined by
comparing the procurement cost at this stage 4b5 with
the unit processing margin, that is, the unit revenue
from production minus the processing cost, leading to
the various price breakpoints indicated:
zP
∗ =

0 if a14p1 −c15+a24p2 −c25−≤b1
min
(
D617
a617
1QP
)
if a14p1 −c15+a24p2 −c25−>b
≥a6174s617−c6175++a6274p627−c6275−1
min
(
D627
a627
1QP
)
if a6174s617−c6175++a6274p627−c6275
−>b≥a14s1 −c15++a24s2 −c25+−1
QP if a14s1 −c15++a24s2 −c25+−>b1
(1)
where 617 denotes the index of the product with
min4D1/a11D2/a25 and 627 denotes the other.
In stage 1, the firm chooses the optimal contract
volume (input volume to reserve) QP ∗ with respect
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to the demand uncertainty D˜ so as to maximize the
expected profit V P 4QP 5 = Ɛ6P 4QP3 D˜57 − PQP . The
optimal contract volume is determined by comparing
the reservation price  with the expected marginal
revenue of an additional contracted unit. At stage 2,
the marginal revenue depends on the exercise deci-
sion of the firm. When the difference between the unit
processing margin and the exercise price is positive,
the firm optimally exercises this additional contracted
unit, and the marginal revenue is given by this dif-
ference. Otherwise, the unit is not exercised, and the
marginal revenue is zero.
Proposition 1. QP ∗ =0 if ≥ 4a14p1 −c15+a24p2 −c25
−−b5+ and QP ∗ → if ≤ 4a14s1 −c15++a24s2 −c25+−
−b5+. Otherwise, QP ∗ solves ¡V P/¡QP QP ∗=0, where
¡V P
¡QP
= −+ Pr
(
D˜1
a1
>QP 1
D˜2
a2
>QP
)
· 4a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−− b5+
+ Pr
(
D˜1
a1
>QP 1
D˜2
a2
≤QP
)
· 4a14p1 − c15+ a24s2 − c25+ −− b5+
+ Pr
(
D˜1
a1
≤QP 1 D˜2
a2
>QP
)
· 4a14s1 − c15+ + a24p2 − c25−− b5+
+ Pr
(
D˜1
a1
≤QP 1 D˜2
a2
≤QP
)
· 4a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+ −− b5+0 (2)
When there is unsatisfied demand in each market,
the marginal revenue of an additional contracted unit
is a function of the total sales revenues from both mar-
kets. When there is no unsatisfied demand in each
market, the marginal revenue is a function of the total
salvage revenues from both markets. Otherwise, it is
a function of the sales revenue from the high demand
market and the salvage revenue from the low demand
market.
5. The Value of Fixed Proportions
Technology: The Role of
Demand Correlation
In this section, I conduct sensitivity analysis to study
the impact of demand correlation on the proportional
(P ) technology. To increase the understanding, I make
comparisons with two other production technology
benchmarks that are commonly discussed in the liter-
ature. In particular, I consider flexible 4F5 and dedicated
4D5 technologies. With the flexible technology, a sin-
gle input is capable of producing two products, and
each unit of processed input is used only in one mar-
ket, and yields either a1 units of product 1 or a2 units
of product 2. With the dedicated technology, there are
two inputs that can each produce a single product,
and each unit of processed input in market j yields
aj units of product j . The production technologies are
summarized in Figure 1. Let QP and QF denote the
reserved input volume with the proportional and the
flexible technology, respectively, whereas QDj denotes
the reserved input volume with the dedicated tech-
nology in market j = 112. Let i denote the unit reser-
vation price and V i∗ denote the optimal expected
profit with technology i ∈ 8D1 F 1P9.3
I assume that the first product is the premium prod-
uct such that the sales and the salvage revenues are
higher in the first market, i.e., a14p1 − c15 > a24p2 − c25
and a14s1 − c15+ ≥ a24s2 − c25+. I also assume that the
sales revenue in the second market is higher than the
salvage revenue in the first market, i.e., a24p2 − c25 >
a14s1 − c15+. These assumptions imply that, with the
flexible technology, the firm has a sales revenue in the
second market only if there is no unsatisfied demand
in the first market, and the firm has a salvage revenue
only in the first market, which is the case when there
is no unsatisfied demand in each market.
The extant literature studies the impact of demand
correlation with the flexible technology in compari-
son with the dedicated technology by establishing a
unique flexible cost threshold for a given dedicated
cost such that the profits are identical with each tech-
nology, and analyzing how this threshold changes
in the demand correlation (see, e.g., Boyabatlı and
Toktay 2011, Goyal and Netessine 2011). I follow a
similar approach. In particular, for a given D, I estab-
lish a unique unit reservation price threshold ¯i4D5
for technology i ∈ 8F 1P9 such that V i∗ ≥ V D∗ when
i ≤ ¯i4D5 and V i∗ < V D∗ otherwise. I then conduct
sensitivity analysis to study how ¯i4D5 changes in
demand correlation. To avoid uninteresting cases, I
assume D and b are such that the firm procures
a positive and finite volume in each market with
the dedicated technology, i.e., b < a24p2 − c25− and
4a14s1 − c15+ −− b5+ <D < a24p2 − c25−− b.4
Paralleling the extant literature, I can show that
¯F 4D5≥ D in my setting, i.e., the firm can sustain a
higher unit reservation price with the flexible technol-
ogy than the dedicated technology. The reason is that
the input can be allocated between the two products
in response to demand realizations, and thus, the flex-
ible technology has a capacity-pooling benefit over
3 If QP , QF , and QDj refer to the capacity investment level instead of
the procurement volume, then i denotes the unit capacity invest-
ment cost with technology i, and b denotes the unit production cost.
4 These conditions can be easily verified using Proposition 1: dedi-
cated technology is a special case of proportional technology where
each input is used only in market j , i.e., a−j = 0.
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Figure 1 Production Technology Structures
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Notes. With proportional (P ) technology, the input volume QP serves both markets, and one unit of input yields aj units of product in each market. With
flexible (F ) technology, QF serves both markets, and one unit of input yields aj units of product in market j . With dedicated (D) technology, there is an input
volume QDj for market j , and one unit of input yields aj units of product in this market.
the dedicated technology. Proposition 2 demonstrates
that the threshold is the largest with the proportional
technology.
Proposition 2. ¯P 4D5 > D and ¯P 4D5 > ¯F 4D5.
With the dedicated technology, to produce one unit
of each product, 1/aj units of input are required in
market j = 112. With the proportional technology, to
produce one unit of each product, max41/a111/a25
units of input are required. Since the same input is
used for producing both products, the proportional
technology has a cost-pooling benefit over the ded-
icated technology, and thus, ¯P 4D5 > D. With the
flexible technology, to produce one unit of each prod-
uct, 1/a1 + 1/a2 units of input are required. Since
max41/a111/a25 < 1/a1 + 1/a2, the proportional tech-
nology requires a smaller input volume than the
flexible technology. Therefore, the cost-pooling bene-
fit of the proportional technology is larger than the
capacity-pooling benefit of the flexible technology,
and ¯P 4D5 > ¯F 4D5.
The cost-pooling feature of the proportional tech-
nology is different from the capacity-pooling feature
of the flexible technology. With the flexible technol-
ogy, paralleling the proportional technology, a single
input is capable of producing two products. However,
unlike the proportional technology, each unit of input
is used in one product. A key distinction between two
pooling features is the impact of demand correlation
on their value:
Proposition 3. Let 4D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follow a bivariate
normal distribution: ¡¯F 4D5/¡ ≤ 0 and ¡¯P 4D5/¡
≥ 0.
The threshold ¯F 4D5 captures the capacity-pooling
value of the flexible technology, whereas ¯P 4D5
captures the cost-pooling value of the proportional
technology. The common intuition prevalent in the
academic literature argues that the capacity-pooling
value of the flexible technology decreases in the
demand correlation (see, e.g., Van Mieghem and Rudi
2002). Paralleling this intuition, ¯F 4D5 decreases in
the demand correlation in my setting. Interestingly,
Proposition 3 demonstrates that the cost-pooling
value of the proportional technology increases in
the demand correlation. With low demand correla-
tion, when the demand for one product is high, the
demand for the other is low. Therefore, the firm can
enjoy a sales revenue only in one of the markets. With
high demand correlation, when the demand for one
product is high, the demand for the other is also high.
Therefore, the firm can enjoy a sales revenue in each
market. In summary, a higher correlation decreases
the demand imbalance in the product markets, and
facilitates the effective usage of the proportional tech-
nology. Therefore, ¯P 4D5 increases in the demand
correlation.
I next analyze the impact of demand correlation
on the optimal contract volume with each technol-
ogy, focusing on the case where the firm has identical
profit.
Proposition 4. Let P = ¯P 4D5 and F = ¯F 4D5,
i.e., V P ∗ = V F ∗ = V D∗; and let 4D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follow a
bivariate normal distribution. For these given i for i ∈
8D1 F 1P9:
(i) Dedicated (D) technology: ¡QDj
∗
/¡= 0 for j = 112.
(ii) Flexible (F) technology: ¡QF ∗/¡ > 0 if QF ∗ >
1 +2 and ¡QF ∗/¡ < 0 if QF ∗ <1 +2.
(iii) Proportional (P) technology: ¡QP ∗/¡ > 0 if b >
4a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+ − 5+, and ¡QP ∗/¡ = 0
otherwise.
With the dedicated technology, intuitively, the opti-
mal contract volume in each market is independent
of the demand correlation. With the flexible technol-
ogy, since the input is allocated to the first market
before the second market, the marginal revenue of an
additional contracted unit at stage 2 is characterized
by the realizations of the first product demand D˜1/a1,
and the total demand D˜1/a1 + D˜2/a2. Because the total
demand matters, the impact of demand correlation
critically depends on the total expected demand. In
particular, the optimal contract volume increases in
the demand correlation only when this volume is
greater than the total expected demand. With the
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proportional technology, as demonstrated in Proposi-
tion 1, joint demand from both markets matters. Inter-
estingly, the optimal contract volume always (weakly)
increases in the demand correlation. This is because
the value of cost pooling increases, and thus, the firm
takes more investment risk by increasing QP ∗.
In summary, the impact of demand correlation on
the fixed proportions technology is structurally dif-
ferent from the impact on the flexible and the dedi-
cated technologies. My results have important man-
agerial implications about the new product strategy of
processors in the agricultural industries, as I discuss
in §8.
6. Supply Management in the
Presence of Spot Market
In the previous sections, I studied the characteriza-
tion of the optimal contract volume with the fixed
proportions technology, and the impact of demand
correlation on this volume in comparison with the
flexible and the dedicated production technologies. In
this section, focusing on the fixed proportions tech-
nology, I study the same in the presence of spot mar-
ket, highlighting the impact of the spot market access
on my results. This is because the processing firms
in agricultural industries may also rely on the spot
market for procurement of their primary input. Moti-
vated by the empirical observations that document
the high degree of uncertainty in the spot market
prices in these industries, I conduct sensitivity analy-
sis to study the impact of spot price variability on the
optimal contract volume.
In practice, the processing firms use quantity flex-
ibility contracts with different reservation and exer-
cise prices. Consider two contracts, one with the lower
reservation price and the other with the lower exercise
price. In the literature, the differences between the two
contracts in terms of their profitability is well under-
stood. However, the literature remains silent on the
differences in terms of their response to uncertainties.
I attempt to fill this void by studying whether there
exist any structural differences in my sensitivity anal-
ysis results based on the exercise price of the contract.
The remainder of this section is organized as fol-
lows: Section 6.1 discusses the additional modeling
assumptions introduced beyond my model in §3. Sec-
tion 6.2 derives the optimal supply management strat-
egy in the presence of spot market. Section 6.3 investi-
gates the impact of demand correlation and spot price
variability on the optimal contract volume, emphasiz-
ing the differences among the contract types.
6.1. Additional Modeling Assumptions
For procurement, besides the quantity flexibility con-
tract, I consider spot market. The input can be sourced
from the spot market on the day at the prevailing spot
price S. The firm can also resell the contracted input
to the spot market on the day at a unit price S41 − t5,
where 0 ≤ t ≤ 1. Here, t < 1 may represent the trans-
action cost paid to the exchange market or the cost
incurred for the transportation of the input sold to
the buyer’s premises. When t = 1, there is no value
of spot sale in my model. In practice, this represents
the case where the firm chooses not to participate in
the spot resale market as a part of its procurement
strategy. This case is relevant for the majority of the
processors in the cocoa industry, as well as the pro-
cessors in the beef industry (Boyabatlı et al. 2011).
To model the uncertainties, I assume that
4S˜1 D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follows a trivariate distribution,
where S˜ has a continuous marginal distribution with
c.d.f. F 4S˜5, mean S , and standard deviation S ;
and 4D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follows a bivariate distribution
as described in §3. Let ¯Sj denote the correlation
coefficient between S˜ and D˜j/aj for j = 112. In
a short-term planning horizon, as considered in
this paper, paralleling Boyabatlı et al. (2011), it is
reasonable to assume ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0. Over a longer
time period, the information from the downstream
demand is carried to the upstream spot market.
Therefore, this correlation can be different from
zero, and is determined by the relationship between
the firm-specific demand D˜j/aj and the (aggregate)
industry demand for product j . A higher industry
demand signals a higher dependence on the input
in the future, and thus, increases the spot price
for the input. Typically, the firm-specific demand
D˜j/aj follows the same pattern with the industry
demand for product j , yielding ¯Sj > 0. In some cases,
the firm-specific demand may follow the opposite
pattern with the industry demand. For example,
consider a wheat processor serving animal feed to
feedlots. In anticipation of the future price increase in
the wheat markets due to a high industry demand,
some of these feedlots may decide to source animal
feed from soybean or sugar processors. In this case,
the firm-specific demand for the animal feed made
of wheat is low, but the spot price of wheat is high
due to a high industry demand, yielding ¯Sj < 0.
I do not make any assumptions about ¯Sj in my
analysis, however, I focus on the more practical case
of ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0 when delineating my managerial
insights in §8. For comparative statics analysis, I
assume 4S˜1 D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 to follow a multivarite
normal distribution.
For the quantity flexibility contract, I assume  >
Ɛ64S˜41 − t5 − b5+7, i.e., the unit reservation price is
higher than the expected revenue from (profitable)
spot sales. Otherwise, the firm optimally reserves an
infinite volume of input. I also assume b < a14p1 −c15+
a24p2 − c25−, i.e., the exercise price is lower than the
unit processing margin when both products are sold.
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Otherwise, the contract is never exercised on the day
for processing.
For processing, I assume  ≥ a14s1 − c15+ +
a24s2 − c25+, i.e., the unit processing margin is non-
positive when both products are salvaged. Otherwise,
when the spot price is sufficiently low, the firm opti-
mally buys infinite volume of input from the spot
market. Let
h3
0= a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−1
h2
0= a14p1 − c15+ a24s2 − c25+ −1 (3)
h1
0= a14s1 − c15+ + a24p2 − c25−
denote the unit processing margins, which correspond
to the first three marginal revenue terms in (2) of
Proposition 1. Without loss of generality, I assume
h1 ≤ h2. I also assume that  is sufficiently low such
that all three unit processing margins are positive.5
Paralleling §3, I model the firm’s decisions as a two-
stage problem. In stage 1, the firm chooses the con-
tract volume under the spot price and the demand
uncertainties. In stage 2, these uncertainties are real-
ized and the firm decides the input volume to exer-
cise from the contract, and the input volume for the
spot market transactions (procurement and sales) that
collectively determine the processing volume, and in
turn, the production quantity of each output via the
fixed proportions of this processing volume.
6.2. The Optimal Strategy
In this section, I describe the optimal solution for the
firm’s decisions. I make comparisons with the optimal
solution in §4 to highlight the impact of spot market
access.
In stage 2, the firm observes the demand 4D11D25
and the spot price S realizations. The firm decides
the processing volume, how to source this volume
from the reserved input QP and the spot procure-
ment, and the spot resale volume of the contracted
input. The firm’s decision problem can be defined as
a single-variable optimization problem over the pro-
cessing volume zP where the stage 2 objective func-
tion is given by
çP 4zP 5
0= −min4zP 1QP 5max4min4S1b51S41−t55
−4zP −QP 5+S+QP 4S41−t5−b5+
−zP +
2∑
j=1
[
aj4pj −cj5min
(
zP 1
Dj
aj
)
+aj4sj −cj5+
(
zP −Dj
aj
)+]
0 (4)
5 My model requires h3 > 0; otherwise, the firm cannot generate any
revenues. When h1 or h2 takes negative values, the characterization
of the optimal solution continues to hold. However, the discus-
sion of my comparative statics results are more involved. To avoid
unnecessary complications, I assume h1 > 0.
The first line denotes the total procurement cost,
whereas the second line denotes the total revenue
from the product markets minus the processing cost.
The total procurement cost is given by the sum of the
procurement cost for the first min4zP 1QP 5 units and
the same for the remaining 4zP −QP 5+ units minus the
spot sale revenue when the input volume QP is prof-
itably sold. For 0 ≤ zP ≤QP , when the spot sale is not
profitable, i.e., S41 − t5 < b, the unit procurement cost
is given by the cost of the cheapest source (sourced
either from the contract at a cost of b, or from the spot
market at a cost of S). When the spot sale is profitable,
i.e., S41 − t5≥ b, it is also cheaper to source from the
contract than the spot market. Therefore, the unit pro-
curement cost is the opportunity cost of not selling
this input to the spot market, i.e., S41 − t5. Combin-
ing these two scenarios, the unit procurement cost is
given by max4min4S1 b51 S41 − t55. For the processing
volume exceeding QP , the input can only be sourced
from the spot market, and the unit procurement cost
is S.
For D2/a2 ≤ D1/a1, the optimal processing volume
zP
∗ is given by
zP
∗=

0 if h3 ≤max4min4S1b51S41−t551
min
(
D2
a2
1QP
)
if h2 ≤max4min4S1b51S41−t55≤h3 ≤S1
min
(
D1
a1
1QP
)
if max4min4S1b51S41−t55≤h2 ≤h3 ≤S1
D2
a2
if h2 ≤max4min4S1b51S41−t55≤S≤h31
max
(
min
(
D1
a1
1QP
)
1
D2
a2
)
if max4min4S1b51S41−t55≤h2 ≤S≤h31
D1
a1
if S≤h21
(5)
where h2 and h3 are the unit processing margins as
defined in (3). For D1/a1 ≤ D2/a2, zP ∗ is obtained by
interchanging D1/a1 with D2/a2, and substituting h1
with h2 in (5). In comparison with zP
∗ in the absence
of spot market, as given in (1), the unit procure-
ment cost takes two different forms, max4min4S1 b51
S41 − t55 or S, incorporating the spot procurement
and resale options. When t = 1 such that there is no
spot resale, and S > h3 such that spot procurement is
never optimal, (5) is identical to the characterization
in (1) except for one modification: since I assume ≥
a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+, the firm never processes up
to QP when there is no unsatisfied demand in either
market.
In stage 1, the firm determines the optimal volume
of input to reserve QP ∗ with respect to the demand D˜
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and spot price S˜ uncertainties so as to maximize the
expected profit V P 4QP 5= Ɛ6P 4QP3 S˜1 D˜57−QP .
Proposition 5. QP ∗ = 0 if  ≥ −b + S41 − t5 +
Ɛ6max4min4S˜1 h351 b5− S˜41 − t5  S˜ ≤ h3/41 − t57. Other-
wise, QP ∗ solves 4¡V P/¡QP 5 QP ∗= 0, where
¡V P
¡QP
= −+
∫ h3
b
4S˜− b5H14S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ h3/41−t5
h3
4h3 − b5H14S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ 
h3/41−t5
(
S˜41 − t5− b)H14S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ max4b1h25
b
4S˜− b5H24S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ max4b1h25/41−t5
max4b1h25
(
max4b1h25− b
)
H24S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ 
max4b1h25/41−t5
(
S˜41 − t5− b)H24S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ max4b1h15
b
4S˜− b5H34S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ max4b1h15/41−t5
max4b1h15
(
max4b1h15− b
)
H34S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ 
max4b1h15/41−t5
(
S˜41 − t5− b)H34S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ 
b/41−t5
(
S˜41 − t5− b)[1 −H14S˜5−H24S˜5
−H34S˜5
]
dF 4S˜51
H14S˜5
0= Pr
(
D˜1
a1
>QP 1
D˜2
a2
>QP
∣∣∣∣ S˜)1
H24S˜5
0= Pr
(
D˜1
a1
>QP 1
D˜2
a2
≤QP
∣∣∣∣ S˜)1
H34S˜5
0= Pr
(
D˜1
a1
≤QP 1 D˜2
a2
>QP
∣∣∣∣ S˜)0
The optimal contract volume is characterized by com-
paring the unit reservation price  with the expected
marginal revenue of an additional unit of contracted
input. At stage 2, the marginal revenue takes differ-
ent forms as it depends on the spot price and the
demand realizations. To provide the intuition, I focus
on the case where D1/a1 > QP and D2/a2 > QP for a
given S. In this case, the unit processing margin is
given by h3. For S ≤ b, the contract is not exercised
and the marginal revenue is zero. For b ≤ S ≤ h3, it is
profitable to source from the spot market for process-
ing. Therefore, the marginal revenue is given by the
opportunity gain of not buying from the spot market
minus the exercise price b. For h3 ≤ S ≤ h3/41 − t5, it
is not profitable to source from the spot market for
processing, and thus, the marginal revenue is given
by the unit processing margin h3 minus the exercise
price b. For S ≥ h3/41 − t5, spot resale is more prof-
itable than processing, and thus, the marginal revenue
is given by the spot sale revenue S41 − t5 minus the
exercise price b.
The rest of the marginal revenue expression in
Proposition 5 follows a similar structure. At stage 2,
for a given spot price realization S, the marginal rev-
enue is a function of three different identities when it
is profitable to exercise: the spot procurement cost, the
unit processing margin, or the spot sale revenue. The
unit processing margin, h1, h2, or h3, is determined by
the demand realization in each market. When there
is no unsatisfied demand in either market, processing
is not profitable, and thus, only spot sale revenue is
relevant.
In summary, the firm incorporates the spot procure-
ment and resale options when deciding the optimal
contract volume in stage 1. To make comparison with
the characterization of the optimal contract volume in
the absence of the spot market, I focus on the spe-
cial case where the spot price and the demand have
independent distributions.
Corollary 1. When the spot price is independent of
demand, i.e., ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0, the first-order condition in
Proposition 5 is given by
¡V P
¡QP
= −−b+S41−t5
+Pr
(
D˜1
a1
>QP 1
D˜2
a2
>QP
)
G4b1h35
+Pr
(
D˜1
a1
>QP 1
D˜2
a2
≤QP
)
G4b1max4b1h255
+Pr
(
D˜1
a1
≤QP 1 D˜2
a2
>QP
)
G4b1max4b1h155
+Pr
(
D˜1
a1
≤QP 1 D˜2
a2
≤QP
)
G4b1b51
where G4b115
0= Ɛ6max4min4S˜1151 b5 − S˜41 − t5  S˜ ≤
1/41 − t57.
In this case, the marginal cost of an additional unit of
contract is given by the total procurement cost + b.
The expected marginal revenue is given by the sum
of the expected spot sale revenue S41 − t5 and the
expected processing revenue in excess of the spot sale,
which also includes the optimal no exercise decision
of the contract. In particular,
G4b115
0=
∫ b
0
(
b− S˜41 − t5
)
dF 4S˜5+
∫ 1
b
tS˜ dF 4S˜5
+
∫ 1/41−t5
1
(
1 − S˜41 − t5
)
dF 4S˜5
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denotes the expected processing revenue in excess
of the spot sale with the unit processing margin 1
and the exercise price b. When S ≤ b, the contract is
optimally not exercised, and thus, the firm receives
back b, which is deducted as a part of the marginal
cost. The remaining terms are in parallel with my
earlier discussion. The unit processing margin 1 is
determined by the demand realization in each market,
which explains the probability terms in Corollary 1.
When t = 1 such that there is no spot resale, and
S > h3 such that spot procurement is never optimal,
G4b115 = 1, and the first-order condition in Corol-
lary 1 is identical to that of Proposition 1.
6.3. The Impact of Demand Correlation and Spot
Price Variability on Contract Procurement
In this section, I conduct sensitivity analysis to study
how firms should adjust their contract volume in the
presence of spot market as a response to changing
demand correlation and spot price variability. I inves-
tigate whether there exist any structural differences
in this response based on the contract parameters.
To this end, I analyze how my comparative static
results are impacted as the exercise price of the con-
tract changes.
Proposition 6. Let 4S˜1 D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follow a multi-
varite normal distribution. For b ≥ h1, ¡QP ∗/¡ ≥ 0. For
b < h1, when the spot price is independent of demand, i.e.,
¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0, there exists a unique bˆ ∈ 601h15 such that
¡QP
∗
/¡ ≤ 0 if b ≤ bˆ and ¡QP ∗/¡ ≥ 0 if b ≥ bˆ. In this
case, bˆ > 0 if G401h35 < G401h25 + G401h15, and bˆ = 0
otherwise, where G4b115 is as defined in Corollary 1.
Proposition 6 demonstrates that the impact of the
demand correlation on the firm’s optimal supply
management strategy crucially depends on the con-
tract parameter: When the exercise price is sufficiently
high, a higher contract market dependence is the
best response to the increasing demand correlation.
However, a lower contract market dependence may
be the best response to the same when the exer-
cise price is sufficiently low. I now explain the intu-
ition behind this result. A higher demand correlation
 increases the probability of unsatisfied demand in
each market (with a processing margin h3). It also
decreases the probability of unsatisfied demand in the
low demand market and no unsatisfied demand in
the high demand market (with a processing margin
h1 or h2). Therefore, the impact on QP
∗ is determined
by comparing the increase in the expected marginal
revenue of contracting based on the h3 case with the
decrease in the same based on the h1 and h2 cases.
When b ≥ h1, the contract is not exercised when the
processing margin is h1, and the former effect out-
weighs the latter, increasing QP ∗. When b < h1, the net
impact cannot be proven analytically except for the
¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0 case. In this case, under the condition
given in Proposition 6, QP ∗ decreases in  when the
exercise price b is sufficiently small. This condition
is satisfied, for example, when there is no spot sale
4t = 15 and = a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+.
In the absence of spot market, G4b115 = 1, and
because h3 > h2 + h1 by definition, the condition
in Proposition 6 is never satisfied. Therefore, QP ∗
increases in  for any b, as shown in Proposition 4.
In the presence of spot market, the expected process-
ing revenue in excess of the spot sale is lower than
the processing margin due to the spot procurement
option. As a result, the condition in Proposition 6 can
be satisfied.
To understand the impact of demand correlation
for the b < h1 case without the ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0 assump-
tion, I conduct numerical experiments. The parame-
ter levels for these experiments are chosen based on
my interactions with the procurement managers of a
cocoa processor and a multinational consumer goods
company that procures cocoa butter and cocoa pow-
der. I assume that 4S˜1 D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follows a trivari-
ate normal distribution, where S˜ has a marginal dis-
tribution with mean S ∈ 8113001115001117009 and
standard deviation S ∈ 84%18%112%9 of S ; and
4D˜1/a11 D˜2/a255 follows a symmetric bivariate distri-
bution with mean 1 = 2 ∈ 8121000114100011610009,
standard deviation 1 = 2 ∈ 84%18%112%9 of j ,
and correlation coefficient  ∈ 8010021004100610089. For
the quantity commitment contract, I assume a reser-
vation price  ∈ 85%120%150%9 of S .6 I use a1 =
a2 = 005, h3 = 11650, h2 = 11225, h1 = 425, and t = 1.7
For the correlation between the spot price and the
demand, I assume ¯S1 = ¯S2 ∈ 8−00251002510059. For
each ¯Sj , I focus on 243 numerical instances to investi-
gate the impact of  on the optimal contract volume.
To study how the sign of this impact changes with
the exercise price, I consider 10 b ∈ 601h15 values. Let
QP
∗
4k1 b5 denote the optimal contract volume with
the kth  level and the exercise price b. I calculate the
sign of QP ∗4k+11 b5−QP ∗4k1 b5, and investigate how
this sign changes as b increases. In all my numerical
experiments, this sign changes once from negative to
positive, i.e., QP ∗ first decreases then increases in ,
as b increases except for nine instances in the ¯Sj = 005
6 These reservation prices satisfy  > 41 − t5S such that the firm
does not reserve an infinite volume of input and  < S41 − t5 +
G401h35 such that the firm reserves a positive input volume for
b ≥ 0.
7 Cocoa beans are first processed into cocoa liquor, which is further
processed into cocoa butter and powder. These proportions reflect
the yields out of the cocoa liquor. There is a 20% yield loss in
the processing of cocoa beans into cocoa liquor. To capture this
yield loss, I adjust the cocoa bean mean spot price representing
the period between 2005 and 2007 by 1/008 to determine S in my
experiments.
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case where the sign is positive for all b values con-
sidered.8 These observations are consistent with the
existence of bˆ ∈ 601h15, as shown in Proposition 6.
As in Proposition 6, the impact of spot price
variability on the optimal contract volume crucially
depends on the exercise price of the contract:
Proposition 7. Assume that there is no spot sale pos-
sibility, i.e., t = 1; and let S˜ follow a normal distribution
that is independent of demand, i.e., ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0:
(i) When S ≥ 4h2 + h35/2, ¡QP ∗/¡S ≥ 0 if b ≥
min42S −h31h35 and ¡QP ∗/¡S ≤ 0 otherwise.
(ii) When 4h2 +h35/2>S ≥ 4h1 +h35/2, ¡QP ∗/¡S ≥
0 if b ≥ min4S1h25 and ¡QP ∗/¡S ≤ 0 if b ≤ h1.
(iii) When 4h1 +h35/2>S ≥ 4h1 +h25/2, ¡QP ∗/¡S ≥
0 if b ≥ min4S1h25.
(iv) When 4h1 + h25/2 > S ≥ h1/2, ¡QP ∗/¡S ≥ 0 if
b ≥ min4S1h15.
(v) When S <h1/2, ¡QP
∗
/¡S ≥ 0.
As follows from Corollary 1, the impact of S
on QP ∗ is determined by its effect on the expected
marginal revenue from processing terms G4b1h35,
G4b1min4b1h255 and G4b1min4b1h155. The overall
effect can be characterized in five cases based on the
mean spot price S . When S ≥ h2 + h3/2 (case (i)),
Proposition 7 establishes a unique exercise price
threshold b¯, which is critical for the impact of S
on QP ∗. In particular, when the exercise price is
larger than b¯, QP ∗ increases in S . The reason is that,
with an increase in S , the contract benefits from
high S realizations (when the marginal revenue at
stage 2 is characterized by the opportunity gain of not
using spot procurement), whereas it is not negatively
affected from low S realizations due to the downside
protection b (when the contract is not exercised at
stage 2). When the exercise price is smaller than b¯,
QP
∗ decreases in S . This is because, with an increase
in S , the contract is negatively affected from low S
realizations, whereas it does not benefit from high S
realizations (when the marginal revenue is character-
ized by the unit processing margin). When S < h1/2
(case (v)), b¯ = 0, and thus, QP ∗ increases in S for all
the b values considered.
In the remaining S range (cases (ii)–(iv)), Proposi-
tion 7 provides a partial characterization based on the
exercise price b. Therefore, I resort to numerical exper-
iments. In these experiments, I use the same param-
eter set as the demand correlation analysis except
for  ∈ 80100410089, and S ∈ 84%16%18%110%112%9
of S . For ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0, I focus on 243 numerical
8 The condition in Proposition 6 is satisfied in my numerical set-
ting. To validate my numerical code, I carry out additional experi-
ments for the ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0 case. In all these experiments, paralleling
Proposition 6, the sign of QP ∗4k+11 b5 − QP ∗4k1 b5 changes once
from negative to positive.
instances to investigate the impact of S on the opti-
mal contract volume. To study how the sign of this
impact changes with the exercise price, I consider 15
b ∈ 601h15, 30 b ∈ 6h11h25, and 15 b ∈ 6h21h35 values. Let
QP
∗
4kS 1 b5 denote the optimal contract volume with
the kth S level and the exercise price b. Focusing only
on the interior optimal solutions (with strictly positive
contract volume), I calculate the sign of QP ∗4k+1S 1 b5−
QP
∗
4kS 1 b5, and investigate how this sign changes as
b increases. In all my numerical experiments, either
this sign changes once from negative to positive as b
increases or this sign is always negative. In the lat-
ter case, the positive values are not observed because
high b values lead to QP ∗ = 0.9
In summary, Proposition 7 and my numerical
experiments demonstrate that the impact of spot price
variability on the firm’s optimal supply management
strategy crucially depends on the contract parameter:
when the exercise price is high, a higher contract mar-
ket dependence is the best response to the increasing
spot price variability, whereas a lower contract mar-
ket dependence is the best response to the same when
the exercise price is low.
To understand the impact of spot price variabil-
ity without the ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0 assumption, I replicate
my numerical experiments with ¯S1 = ¯S2 ∈ 8−00251
00251 0059. For the ¯Sj = −0025 case, paralleling the
¯Sj = 0 case, I observe that the sign of QP ∗4k+1S 1 b5−
QP
∗
4kS 1 b5 either changes once from negative to posi-
tive as b increases, or is always negative. For the other
¯Sj cases, the result is inconclusive as I observe addi-
tional patterns, including the sign changing once from
positive to negative, and the sign changing multiple
times. The most significant consequence of this analy-
sis is that, in a long-term planning horizon where the
correlation between the spot price and the demand is
typically different from zero, this correlation is instru-
mental in deciding whether to increase or decrease
the contract procurement as a response to increasing
spot price variability.
7. Discussion of Assumptions and
Extensions
In this section, I discuss relaxing two of my assump-
tions, the fixed-price sales contract and the absence of
output spot procurement. I only provide a qualitative
summary of my results. The details of the analysis are
available upon request.
9 The S values considered (which are representative of the cocoa
industry) correspond to cases (i) and (ii) of Proposition 7. To ana-
lyze cases (iii) and (iv), I replicate my experiments with S ∈
870019001111009. Besides the two patterns observed in the origi-
nal experiments, I also observe instances where the optimal con-
tract volume increases in S for all b values considered, paralleling
case (v) of Proposition 7.
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7.1. Pass-Through Sales Contract
Throughout the paper, I assume that the firm uses
a fixed-price sales contract. Another common form
of sales contract used in the agricultural industries
is the pass-through contract, where the sales price of
the product includes a fixed processing margin and a
variable component that is indexed on the spot price
of the input.10 In this section, I study the optimal sup-
ply management strategy with the pass-through sales
contract, and investigate the impact of demand corre-
lation and spot price variability on this strategy.
To analyze this problem, I assume that the proces-
sor uses a pass-through sales contract in the first mar-
ket, and the sales price is given by p1 + S, where
≥ 0 denotes the degree of pass-through. When ≥
1/a1, the spot procurement cost of the input vol-
ume required to produce one unit of the first prod-
uct 4S/a15 is fully charged to the consumer. Therefore,
I denote  ≥ 1/a1 as the full pass-through sales con-
tract. Similarly, I denote  < 1/a1 as the partial pass-
through sales contract, where = 0 corresponds to the
fixed-price sales contract. When > 0, the sales price
depends on the spot price, and thus, it is uncertain at
the time of the input contract procurement (stage 1).
Throughout the analysis, I focus on the case where
there is no spot sale possibility, i.e., t = 1.
In stage 2, the characterization of the optimal pro-
cessing volume is identical to (5) except for the unit
processing margins h3 and h2 are substituted by
hˆ34S5
0= h3 + a1S and hˆ24S5 0= h2 + a1S, respectively.
In stage 1, the characterization of the optimal con-
tract volume critically depends on the pass-through
level . To provide the intuition, I focus on the spe-
cial case where the spot price and the demand have
independent distributions. In this case, the first-order
condition in Corollary 1 is given by
¡V P
¡QP
= −−b+H1
[
G
(
b1max
(
b1
h3
41−a15+
))
+a1
Ɛ
[(
S˜−max
(
b−h3
a1
1
h3
41−a15+
))+]]
+H2
[
G
(
b1max
(
b1
h2
41−a15+
))
+a1
Ɛ
[(
S˜−max
(
b−h2
a1
1
h2
41−a15+
))+]]
+H3G4b1max4b1h155+b41−H1 −H2 −H351
where H1
0= Pr4D˜1/a1 > QP 1 D˜2/a2 > QP 5, H2 0=
Pr4D˜1/a1 >QP 1 D˜2/a2 ≤QP 5, and H3 0= Pr4D˜1/a1 ≤QP 1
10 For example, in the cocoa industry, the sales price of the cocoa
butter can be linked to the spot price of the cocoa beans based on
the extraction rate of the butter from the beans, a practice called
ratio pricing.
D˜2/a2 > Q
P 5. With the full pass-through sales con-
tract 4 ≥ 1/a15, when D1/a1 >QP , the expected pro-
cessing revenue is given by G4b15 = Ɛ6max4S˜1 b57:
In stage 2, it is always profitable to source from the
spot market for processing, i.e., S ≤ hˆj4S5 = hj + a1S
for j = 213, and thus, the processing revenue is the
opportunity gain of not procuring from the spot mar-
ket. With the partial pass-through sales contract 4 <
1/a15, when D1/a1 >QP , the expected processing rev-
enue is given by the sum of two terms, the revenue
with the fixed processing margin hj/41 − a15, and
the additional revenue over this fixed margin due to
the pass-through of the input spot price. With the
fixed-price sales contract 4 = 05, only the first term
is relevant, and the expected processing revenue is
G4b1max4b1hj55, as given in Corollary 1.
The impact of demand correlation on the optimal con-
tract volume. With the partial pass-through sales con-
tract, paralleling the fixed-price sales contract, when
the exercise price is high (low), a higher (lower) con-
tract market dependence is the best response to the
increasing demand correlation. With the full pass-
through sales contract, unlike the fixed-price sales
contract, a lower contract market dependence is the
best response to the same regardless of the exer-
cise price. This is because when there is unsatisfied
demand in the first market, it is always profitable to
source from the spot market for processing.
The impact of spot price variability on the optimal con-
tract volume. With the partial pass-through sales con-
tract, paralleling the fixed-price sales contract, there
exists an exercise price threshold such that when the
exercise price is higher (lower) than this threshold,
a higher (lower) contract market dependence is the
best response to the increasing spot price variabil-
ity. Unlike the fixed-price sales contract, this thresh-
old can be equal to zero such that a higher contract
market dependence may be the best response to the
increasing spot price variability regardless of the exer-
cise price. The reason is that the expected value of
processing increases due to the pass-through of the
spot price. With the full pass-through sales contract,
a higher contract market dependence is always the
best response to the increasing spot price variability
regardless of the exercise price of the procurement
contract. The reason is that the expected value of the
opportunity gain of not procuring from the spot mar-
ket increases in the spot price variability.
7.2. Access to Output Spot Procurement
Throughout the paper, I assume that the demand is
satisfied from the processed input. If there exists a
spot market for the output, then the firm may also
satisfy the demand by sourcing from this spot market.
In practice, this observation is relevant, for example,
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for the oilseed processors.11 In this section, I study the
optimal supply management strategy, and the impact
of demand correlation and (input) spot price vari-
ability on this strategy in the presence of the input
and the output spot markets in comparison with the
benchmark case (in the absence of the output spot
market), as considered in §6.
To analyze this problem, I assume that the first
product can be sourced from the output spot mar-
ket at the prevailing price M on the day (stage 2),
which is uncertain at the time of the contract procure-
ment (stage 1), where 4M˜1 S˜1 D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25 follows a
multivariate distribution. I normalize the salvage val-
ues and the product-specific processing costs to zero,
i.e., s1 = s2 = c1 = c2 = 0. With this model, the firm’s
stage-2 objective function is identical to (4) except
for one modification: p1 min4a1zP 1D15 is substituted
by D14p1 − M5+ + min4a1zP 1D15min4p11M5. In other
words, the revenue from the first product market is
given by the sum of the revenue when the demand
is (profitably) satisfied from the output spot market
and the additional revenue from processing. The unit
revenue from processing is given by the opportu-
nity gain of not procuring that unit from the (out-
put) spot market when it is profitable to satisfy the
demand from the spot market; and it is given by
the sales price otherwise. In stage 1, the characteri-
zation of the optimal contract volume is identical to
Proposition 5, except for two minor modifications: h3
and h2 are substituted by the unit processing mar-
gins hˆ34M5
0= a1 min4p11M5 + a2p2 −  and hˆ24M5 0=
a1 min4p11M5−, respectively; and an expectation is
taken with respect to the M˜ distribution. In compar-
ison with the benchmark case, because the process-
ing revenue is smaller in the first market, the opti-
mal contract volume is lower. In contrast, the optimal
expected profit is higher because of the output spot
procurement option.
To conduct sensitivity analysis to investigate the
impact of demand correlation and (input) spot price
variability on the optimal contract volume, I intro-
duce further assumptions. In particular, I normalize
the processing cost to zero, i.e.,  = 0, and focus on
the case where there is no input spot sale possibil-
ity, i.e., t = 1. I assume that the input and the out-
put spot prices are perfectly correlated, M˜
0= S˜, and
leave the analysis with a more general correlation
structure for future research. To focus on the prac-
tically relevant cases, because one unit of the pro-
cessed input leads to a1 units of the first product, I
11 An oilseed pressing plant processes the oilseed (rapeseed, sun-
flower seed, coconut seed, palm fruit, and soybean) to produce
crude vegetable oil (rapeseed oil, sunflower oil, coconut oil, palm
oil, and soybean oil) and a by-product (meal, cake, kernel) in fixed
proportions. Because the oilseed and the crude vegetable oil are
commodities, there exist spot markets for the input and the output.
assume that  is in the vicinity of 1/a1.12 I also assume
4S˜1 D˜1/a11 D˜2/a25, which is sufficient to characterize
the uncertainties, follows a trivariate normal distribu-
tion. With these assumptions, the impact of demand
correlation is structurally the same with the bench-
mark case. In particular, Proposition 6 continues to
hold except for one modification: h3 and h2 are sub-
stituted by hˆ34S5= h3 − 4h2 − a1S5+ and hˆ24S5= h2 −
4h2 − a1S5+. For the impact of input spot price vari-
ability, an analogue of Proposition 7 and additional
numerical experiments demonstrate that this impact
is structurally the same with the benchmark case:
when the exercise price is high (low), a higher (lower)
contract market dependence is the best response to
the increasing spot price variability.
8. Conclusion
The first contribution of this paper is to the litera-
ture on supply management in multiproduct firms.
The majority of papers in this stream study flexi-
ble production technology, where a single input is
capable of producing multiple outputs, and gives rise
to one output in each production run. In practice,
a common feature of the processors in agricultural
industries is that they operate under the fixed pro-
portions production technology, where a single input
gives rise to multiple outputs in fixed proportions in
each production run. In this literature, a few papers
study coproduction systems, where multiple products
are produced in a single production run with ran-
dom yields. These papers remain silent on the impact
of demand uncertainty. I contribute to this literature
by studying the fixed proportions technology under
demand uncertainty and the impact of demand cor-
relation on this technology in comparison with the
flexible technology.
To analyze this problem, I consider a firm (pro-
cessor) that procures a single input and sells two
outputs that are produced in fixed proportions of
this input. The firm chooses its procurement volume
under demand uncertainty, and the processing vol-
ume after this uncertainty is resolved. As a bench-
mark case, I consider a firm that operates under the
flexible technology. With the flexible technology, as
established in the extant literature, since the input can
be allocated between the two outputs in response to
demand realizations, there exists a capacity-pooling
benefit. With the fixed proportions technology, since
the same input is used for producing both outputs,
there exists a cost-pooling benefit. I show that when
the two production systems have the same profitabil-
ity, the cost-pooling benefit of the fixed proportions
technology is larger than the capacity-pooling benefit
12 For the results presented in this section, I assume  ≥ h2/4a1h35.
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Table 1 Impact of a Higher Demand Correlation with Each Production
Technology
Pooling value Contract volume
Fixed proportions
technology
Cost-pooling value
increases
Increase the contract volume
Flexible technology Capacity-pooling
value decreases
Increase the contract volume
when total expected
demand is smaller than
this volume; and decrease
it otherwise
of the flexible technology. My analysis identifies the
critical role that demand correlation plays with each
technology, as summarized in Table 1.
These results have important implications for the
new product strategy of the processors in the agri-
cultural industries. One such strategy, that has been
suggested in the extant literature, is to create a dif-
ferentiated product by mixing the input with differ-
ent ingredients (such as flavors) or by changing the
packaging of the product. Because the differentiated
product uses the same input with the existing prod-
uct, this strategy banks on the capacity-pooling value
of the flexible production technology. My results sug-
gest that converting the biomass (the organic residue
from processing) into a by-product is another potent
strategy that banks on the cost-pooling value of the
fixed proportions technology. In practice, this strat-
egy has already been implemented by the wood pro-
cessors (White 2011), where the biomass is marketed
as fuel, and by the sugarcane processors (Bose 2003),
where the biomass is marketed as fuel or as a wood-
substitute raw material for paper manufacturing. My
results in Table 1 point out that there are fundamen-
tal differences between the two strategies, suggesting
distinct managerial actions. For example, when the
demand correlation between two products increases
in the number of overlapping customers for each
product, my results suggest that a differentiated prod-
uct should be targeted to a new customer base to
decrease demand correlation with the existing prod-
uct, whereas a by-product should be targeted to the
existing customer base to increase this correlation.
The second contribution of this paper is to the liter-
ature on supply management in the presence of con-
tract and spot markets. Barring Boyabatlı et al. (2011),
there is no work in this literature that focuses on the
fixed proportions technology. I contribute to this liter-
ature by studying how the supply management strat-
egy should respond to changing spot price variability
and demand correlation in a new modeling setting
that is relevant for agricultural industries, and inves-
tigating whether there exist any structural differences
in this response based on the contract type. To analyze
this problem, I extend my fixed proportions technol-
ogy model to incorporate for the spot market access
Table 2 The Optimal Response to an Increase in the Spot Price
Variability or the Demand Correlation Based on the Contract
Type in a Short-Term Planning Horizon
Low reservation price High reservation price
High exercise price Low exercise price
Spot price variability Increase the contract
volume
Decrease the contract
volume
Demand correlation Increase the contract
volume
Decrease the contract
volume
of the firm. My analysis provides the results summa-
rized in Table 2.
These results have important implications for the
procurement contract choice of the processors in the
agricultural industries. As established in the litera-
ture, two contracts, one with the lower reservation
price and the other with the lower exercise price, can
generate the same expected profit when the reserva-
tion and exercise prices are appropriately chosen.13
In this case, a processor that is only concerned with
the profit impact of its contract choice is indifferent
between the two contracts. However, the processor
may also be concerned with the volume impact of the
contract choice on its supplier: the processor typically
has a long-term relationship with its supplier, and
in order not to harm this relationship, the processor
prefers not to decrease its procurement volume as a
response to a change in the business environment. In
agricultural industries, two such changes have been
documented in the last two decades. First, spot prices
have shown increasing variability (Meyer 2013). Sec-
ond, the food manufacturers, retailers, and consumer
goods companies (the customers of the processors)
have consolidated their supplier base because of food
safety concerns (Maitland 1997), and thus, multiple
products are sourced from the same processor increas-
ing the demand correlation between these products.
A key implication of my results in Table 2 is that
the contract with the lower reservation price should
be preferred over the contract with the lower exer-
cise price. This is because the former does not require
decreasing of the contract volume with an increase in
the demand correlation or the spot price variability.
My work comes with several limitations. For brev-
ity, I focus on a firm with two outputs. Although the
analysis would be more complex, I expect my main
results to continue to hold with n outputs. In my
model, I assume specific forms of procurement and
sales contracts that are commonly used in agricultural
industries. Analyzing other contract forms should
prove to be an interesting problem for future research.
13 This result can be proven in my setting using the fact that when
the firm optimally uses a contract market, the optimal expected
profit strictly decreases in the reservation or the exercise price of
the contract.
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
fro
m
 in
fo
rm
s.o
rg
 b
y 
[2
02
.16
1.5
7.1
14
] o
n 2
7 D
ec
em
be
r 2
01
5, 
at 
22
:12
 . F
or
 pe
rso
na
l u
se
 on
ly,
 al
l r
igh
ts 
res
erv
ed
. 
Boyabatlı: Supply Management in Multiproduct Firms with Fixed Proportions Technology
3028 Management Science 61(12), pp. 3013–3031, © 2015 INFORMS
On the procurement side, the exercise price can be a
function of the contract volume due to volume dis-
counts (Pei et al. 2011), or can be a function of the
input spot price (Boyabatlı et al. 2011). On the sales
side, the output price can be a function of the pro-
duction volume (Kazaz and Webster 2011). My model
implicitly assumes that the firm has perfect informa-
tion about the supplier when sourcing from the con-
tract market. In the literature, a stream of papers stud-
ies the optimal supply management in the presence
of imperfect information about the supplier’s oper-
ational characteristics including the reliability (Yang
et al. 2009), the production cost (Zhang 2010), and
the product quality (Babich and Tang 2012), all in a
single-product firm. It would be interesting to analyze
whether the insights coming from these papers con-
tinue to hold with the fixed proportions technology.
Other interesting future research directions remain.
Throughout the paper, I assume that the contract
parameters are exogenous. In practice, suppliers may
adjust the contract parameters as a response to
changes in the demand and the spot price uncertain-
ties. It would be interesting to analyze the impact
of these uncertainties on the optimal supply man-
agement strategy in an equilibrium setting, following
the examples of Wu and Kleindorfer (2005) and Pei
et al. (2011), who provide some results in a single-
product firm in the absence of the fixed proportions
technology. I also assume that all the reserved input
volume is available on the spot day. As highlighted
in Tomlin (2006), the contract procurement can be
unreliable and the reserved volume is only partially
available (or completely unavailable) on the day. In
agricultural industries, this unreliability can be driven
by farm-yield uncertainty due to weather conditions.
Modeling the farm-yield uncertainty requires addi-
tional features such as the yield-dependent spot price
(Kazaz and Webster 2011), the yield-dependent pro-
cessing cost (Kazaz 2004), and the yield-dependent
proportions (Boyabatlı and Wee 2013). This is clearly a
different problem and merits a separate study. Finally,
I assume that the firm sources from a single contract.
In the literature, a stream of papers studies sourcing
from multiple contracts and investigates the condi-
tions under which different sourcing policies (such as
single versus dual sourcing) are optimal in a vari-
ety of models. These papers focus on contracts that
have heterogeneous characteristics such as procure-
ment cost (Kleindorfer and Wu 2003, Martínez-de-
Albéniz and Simchi-Levi 2005), unreliability (Tomlin
and Wang 2005, Babich et al. 2007), procurement
capacity (Wang et al. 2010), and delivery lead time
(Wu and Zhang 2014). There is no work in this liter-
ature that analyzes a multiproduct firm. It would be
interesting to study how the optimal sourcing policy
is affected by the fixed proportions technology.
Appendix
Let 4·5 and ê4·5 denote the standard normal p.d.f. and
c.d.f., respectively; ′4z5 = −z4z5, ∫ v− z4z5dz = −4v5.
For a bivariate normal 4X˜11 X˜25 with correlation coefficient
, Pr4X˜1 ≤ x11 X˜2 ≤ x25 is increasing in  for a fixed 4x11x25
as follows from the Slepian’s inequality (Tong 1990, p. 21).
I use the following result from Müller (2001):
Lemma A.1. Let X˜ 4X˜5 have a bivariate normal distribution
with mean Ì 4Ì5 and covariance matrix è 4è5. If Ì=Ì, X˜ and X˜
have the same marginal distributions, èij ≤èij , then X˜ ≤ X˜ in the
supermodular order, i.e. Ɛ6f 4X˜57≤ Ɛ6f 4X˜57 for any supermodular
function f .
Proof of Proposition 1. The proof is omitted. 
Proof of Proposition 2. It is sufficient to prove
P 4D5 >  F 4D5. Because ¡V P ∗/¡P < 0, it is sufficient
to show that V P ∗ > V F ∗ when P = F = . From the
optimality of QP ∗, it is sufficient to prove that V P 4QP 5 >
V F 4QF 5 for QP = QF = Q. V i4Q5 = Ɛ6 i4Q3 D˜57 − Q for
i ∈ 8F 1P9, where  i4Q3D5 = max0≤zi≤Qçi4zi5, and çi4zi5 =
−4b+5zi +ë i4zi5,
ë P 4zP 5
0=
2∑
j=1
[
aj4pj − cj5min
(
zP 1
Dj
aj
)
+ aj4sj − cj5+
(
zP − Dj
aj
)+]
1
ë F 4zF 5
0= a14p1 − c15min
(
zF 1
D1
a1
)
+ a24p2 − c25min
((
zF − D1
a1
)+
1
D2
a2
)
+ a14s1 − c15+
(
zF − D1
a1
− D2
a2
)+
0
For zF = zP = z, çP 4z5≥çF 4z5 because proportional technol-
ogy has a higher salvage value in the first market due to
4z−D1/a15+ ≥ 4z−D1/a1 −D2/a25+; a higher sales revenue in
the second market due to min4z1D2/a25≥ min44z−D1/a15+1
D2/a25; and a higher salvage revenue in the second market
(which does not exist with the flexible technology). Since
çP 4z5≥çF 4z5, where the equality is strict for some demand
realizations, çP 4zP ∗5 ≥ çF 4zF ∗5 from the optimality of zP ∗,
and thus, P 4Q3D5≥F 4Q3D5, where the equality is strict
for some demand realizations. Therefore, Ɛ6P 4Q3 D˜57 >
Ɛ6F 4Q3 D˜57. 
Proof of Proposition 3. I only provide the proof for
the proportional technology. Because ¡V D∗/¡ = 0 and
¡V P
∗
/¡P < 0, it is sufficient to show that, for a given P ,
¡V P
∗
/¡ ≥ 0, which holds true when ¡V P 4Q5/¡ ≥ 0 for a
given QP = Q. It follows from Lemma A.1 that increas-
ing  leads to another bivariate normal distribution that
is preferred over D˜/a in the supermodular order. Because
V P 4Q5 = Ɛ6 i4Q3D/a57 − Q, it is sufficient to prove that
P 4Q3D/a5 is supermodular in D˜/a. I now provide that
proof:
It follows from zP ∗ in (1) that, the optimal stage 2
profit function P 4Q3D/a5 is a function of the ordering
between b and a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+ −≤ a14s1 − c15+ +
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a24p2 − c25− ≤ a14p1 − c15+ a24s2 − c25+ − ≤ a14p1 − c15+
a24p2 − c25−. Therefore, I have four cases to consider.
I only analyze the case a14s1 − c15+ + a24p2 − c25 −  ≤ b ≤
a14p1 −c15+a24s2 −c25+ −. The other cases can be analyzed
in a similar fashion:
P 4Q3D/a5 =

[
a14p1 − c15+ a24s2 − c25+ −− b
]D1
a1
+ [a24p2 − c25− a24s2 − c25+]D2a2
if
D2
a2
≤ D1
a1
≤Q1
[
a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−− b
]D1
a1
if
D1
a1
<
D2
a2
≤Q1
[
a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−− b
]D1
a1
if
D1
a1
≤Q< D2
a2
1[
a14p1 − c15+ a24s2 − c25+ −− b
]
Q
+ [a24p2 − c25− a24s2 − c25+]D2a2
if
D2
a2
≤Q< D1
a1
1[
a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−− b
]
Q
if Q<
D2
a2
≤ D1
a1
1[
a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−− b
]
Q
if Q<
D1
a1
<
D2
a2
0
To prove the supermodularity of P 4Q3D/a5 in D˜/a, it is
sufficient to show ¡2 P/¡4D1/a15¡4D2/a25≥ 0.
¡P 4Q3D/a5
¡4D1/a15
=

a14p1 − c15+ a24s2 − c25+ −− b
if
D2
a2
≤ D1
a1
≤Q1
a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−− b
if
D1
a1
<
D2
a2
≤Q1
a14p1 − c15+ a24p2 − c25−− b
if
D1
a1
≤Q< D2
a2
1
0 if
D2
a2
≤Q< D1
a1
1
0 if Q<
D2
a2
≤ D1
a1
1
0 if Q<
D1
a1
<
D2
a2
0
It is easy to show that for a given D1/a1, ¡ P 4Q3D/a5/
¡4D1/a15 increases as D2/a2 increases. For example, for a
given D1/a1 <Q, as D2/a2 increases, ¡ P 4Q3D/a5/¡4D1/a15
traces the first three regions in (6) in this order. Since
a14p1 − c15 + a24p2 − c25 −  > a14p1 − c15 + a24s2 − c25+ − ,
¡2 P 4Q3D/a5/¡4D1/a15¡4D2/a25≥ 0. 
Proof of Proposition 4. With the dedicated technology,
the first order condition for market j is obtained by sub-
stituting a−j = 0 in (2) of Proposition 1. Because QDj ∗ is a
function of D˜j/aj , it is independent of . For the other tech-
nologies, let J i
0= ¡ V i/¡Qi for i ∈ 8F 1P9. From the implicit
function theorem, sgn4¡Qi∗/¡ 5= sgn4¡ J i/¡ Qi∗ 5.
With the flexible technology, since b < a24p2 − c25− by
assumption, I obtain
J F = −F + a24p2 − c25−− b
+ Pr
(
D˜1
a1
>QF
)(
a14p1 − c15− a24p2 − c25
)
+ Pr
(
D˜1
a1
+ D˜2
a2
≤QF
)
· (4a14s1 − c15+ −− b5+ − 4a24p2 − c25−− b5)1
¡J F
¡
∣∣∣∣
QF
∗
= ¡Pr4D˜1/a1 + D˜2/a2 ≤Q
F ∗5
¡ 
·(4a14s1 − c15+ −− b5+ − 4a24p2 − c25−− b5)1
where the second term is negative from b < a24p2 − c25−.
D˜1/a1 + D˜2/a2 follows a normal distribution with mean ˆ=
1 +2 and standard deviation ˆ =
√
21 +22 + 212.
¡ Pr4D˜1/a1 + D˜2/a2 ≤QF ∗5
¡
= −4Q
F ∗ − ˆ5
ˆ
QF
∗ − ˆ/ˆ
¡ ˆ/¡
1
which is negative for QF ∗ > ˆ, and positive otherwise.
With the proportional technology, J P is as given
in (2). Let A
0= 8D˜1/a1 ≤ QP ∗9 and B 0= 8D˜2/a2 ≤ QP ∗9.
Using the identities, Pr4A¯5 = 1 − Pr4A51 Pr4B¯5 = 1 −
Pr4B5, Pr4AB¯5 = Pr4A5− Pr4AB51 Pr4A¯B5 = Pr4B5− Pr4AB51
Pr4A¯ B¯5= 1 − Pr4A5− Pr4B5+ Pr4AB5, I obtain ¡ J P/¡ QP ∗ =
4¡Pr4AB5/¡5H1 where H = 4a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+ −
 − b5+ − 4a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+ −  − b5. It follows
from the Slepian inequality that ¡Pr4AB5/¡ ≥ 0. Moreover,
H > 0 for b > 4a14s1 − c15+ + a24s2 − c25+ − 5+, and H = 0
otherwise. 
Proof of Proposition 5. The proof is omitted. 
Proof of Corollary 1. The result follows from Propo-
sition 5 by using ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0. 
Proof of Proposition 6. For a given S, 4D˜1/a11 D˜2/a2S5
follow a bivariate normal distribution with mean vector
Ìˆ
′ = 41 + ¯S141/S54S−S51 2 + ¯S242/S54S−S55, stan-
dard deviation vector Ñˆ
′ = 41
√
1 − ¯2S11 2
√
1 − ¯2S25, and
correlation coefficient ˆ= 4− ¯S1¯S25/4
√
1 − ¯2S1
√
1 − ¯2S25. It
follows that increasing  increases ˆ, and does not change
the mean Ìˆ or the standard deviation Ñˆ. Let J P
0= ¡ V P/¡QP
as defined in Proposition 5. From the implicit function theo-
rem, sgn4¡QP ∗/¡ 5= sgn4¡ J P/¡ QP ∗ 5. Let A 0= 84D˜1/a1S5≤
QP
∗
9 and B
0= 84D˜2/a2S5 ≤ QP ∗9. For b ≥ h1, using the
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identities, Pr4A¯5 = 1 − Pr4A51 Pr4B¯5 = 1 − Pr4B51 Pr4A¯B5 =
Pr4B5 − Pr4AB51 Pr4A¯B¯5 = 1 − Pr4A5 − Pr4B5 + Pr4AB5, J P
can be rewritten in terms of Pr4A5, Pr4B51 and Pr4AB5. Let
X4S˜5= ¡Pr4AB5/¡ . Since ˆ is increasing in , X4S˜5≥ 0 from
the Slepian’s inequality. I obtain
¡J P
¡
∣∣∣∣
QP
∗
=
∫ h3
b
4S˜−b5X4S˜5dF 4S˜5+
∫ h3/41−t5
h3
4h3 −b5X4S˜5dF 4S˜5
+
∫ 
h3/41−t5
4S˜41−t5−b5X4S˜5dF 4S˜5
−
∫ h2
b
4S˜−b5X4S˜5dF 4S˜5
−
∫ h2/41−t5
h2
4h2 −b5X4S˜5dF 4S˜5
−
∫ 
h2/41−t5
4S˜41−t5−b5X4S˜5dF 4S˜50
I have two cases to consider. For h2/41 − t5≤ h3,
¡J P
¡
∣∣∣∣
QP
∗
=
∫ h2/41−t5
h2
4S˜−h25X4S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ h3
h2/41−t5
4tS˜5X4S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ h3/41−t5
h3
4h3 − S˜41 − t55X4S˜5 dF 4S˜5≥ 03
and for h3 ≤ h2/41 − t5,
¡J P
¡
∣∣∣∣
QP
∗
=
∫ h3
h2
4S˜−h25X4S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ h2/41−t5
h3
4h3 −h25X4S˜5 dF 4S˜5
+
∫ h3/41−t5
h2/41−t5
4h3 − S˜41 − t55X4S˜5 dF 4S˜5≥ 00
When ¯S1 = ¯S2 = 0, J P is given by (6) in Corollary 1.
Defining A
0= 8D˜1/a1 ≤ QP ∗9 and B 0= 8D˜2/a2 ≤ QP ∗9, for
b ≤ h1, ¡ J P/¡ QP ∗ = 4¡Pr4AB5/¡ 56G4b1 b5 + G4b1h35 −
G4b1h15−G4b1h257, where the first term is positive from the
Slepian’s inequality. Therefore, for a given b, sgn4¡QP ∗/¡ 5
is given by the sign of the second term. Let H4b5 denote this
term. From G4b15 = ∫ b0 4b − S˜41 − t55 dF 4S˜5 + ∫ b tS˜ dF 4S˜5 +∫ /41−t5
 4 − S˜41 − t55 dF 4S˜5, ¡H4b5/¡ b = 1 − F 4b5 > 0. Since
H4h15 > 0, if H405≥ 0, then ¡QP ∗/¡  ≥ 0 for b ≥ 0. If
H405 < 0, then there exists a unique bˆ ∈ 401h15 such that
¡QP
∗
/¡  < 0 for b < bˆ, and ¡QP ∗/¡ ≥ 0 otherwise. 
Proof of Proposition 7. Let J P
0= ¡ V P/¡QP as
given by (6) in Corollary 1. When t = 1, G4b15 =
Ɛ6min4max4S˜1 b5157 for b ≤ . If S˜ follows a normal
distribution with mean S and standard deviation S ,
G4b15 =  + S4L44b−S5/S5 − L44−S5/S55 where
L45 = ∫ −4 − z54z5dz is the standard-normal loss func-
tion. ¡G4b15/¡ S =44b−S5/S5−44−S5/S5, which
is positive if S ≤ 4b+5/2, and negative otherwise.
From the implicit function theorem, sgn4¡QP ∗/¡ S5 =
sgn4¡ J P/¡ S QP ∗ 5. Let A 0= 8D˜1/a1 ≤ QP ∗9 and B 0= 8D˜2/a2 ≤
QP
∗
9. I obtain the following:
P
¡J P
¡S
∣∣∣∣
QP
∗
=Pr4A¯B¯5
[

(
b−S
S
)
−
(
h3 −S
S
)]
+Pr4A¯B5
[

(
b−S
S
)
−
(
max4b1h25−S
S
)]
+Pr4AB¯5
[

(
b−S
S
)
−
(
max4b1h15−S
S
)]
0 (6)
Let H4b5 denote the right-hand side of this equation for a
given QP ∗. Because 4z5 is decreasing in z for z > 0, H4b5 > 0
for b > S . The sign of H4b5 can be analyzed in three cases
based on b.
Case I (h2 ≤ b < h3). Only the first term in H4b5 is
nonzero. Within this b range, H4b5 > 0 for S < 4h2 +h35/2.
For S ≥ 4h2 +h35/2, H4b5 < 0 if b < min42S −h31h35, and
H4b5 > 0 otherwise.
Case II (h1 ≤ b < h2). The first two terms in H4b5 are
nonzero. Within this b range, H4b5 > 0 for S < 4h1 +h25/2,
and H4b5 < 0 for S ≥ 4h2 +h35/2.
Case III (0 ≤ b < h1). All three terms in H4b5 are nonzero.
Within this b range, H4b5 > 0 for S <h1/2, and H4b5 < 0 for
S ≥ 4h1 +h35/2.
Rearranging these cases, and using H4b5 > 0 for b > S
give the desired result. 
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